Moral debunking arguments are meant to show that, by realist lights, moral beliefs are not explained by moral facts, which in turn is meant to show that they lack some significant counterfactual connection to the moral facts (e.g., safety, sensitivity, reliability). The dominant, “minimalist” response to the arguments—sometimes defended under the heading of “third-factors” or “pre-established harmonies”—involves affirming that moral beliefs enjoy the relevant counterfactual connection while granting that these beliefs are not explained by the moral facts. We show that (...) the minimalist gambit rests on a controversial thesis about epistemic priority: that explanatory concessions derive their epistemic import from what they reveal about counterfactual connections. We then challenge this epistemic priority thesis, which undermines the minimalist response to debunking arguments (in ethics and elsewhere). (shrink)

Two families of positions dominate debates over a metaphysically reductive analysis of knowledge. Traditionalism holds that knowledge has a complete, uniquely identifying analysis, while knowledge-first epistemology contends that knowledge is primitive—admitting of no reductive analysis whatsoever. Drawing on recent work in metaphysics, I argue that these alternatives fail to exhaust the available possibilities. Knowledge may have a merely partial analysis: a real definition that distinguishes it from some, but not all other things. I demonstrate that this position is attractive; it (...) evades concerns that its rivals face. (shrink)

With a new introduction by the author In this deliciously polemical work, a giant of cultural theory immerses himself in the ideas of a giant of French thought.

The aim of the paper is to find out, whether in situation of several competitive concepts, when the traditional justification of morals and the validity of conventional moral concepts are questioned, an ethical theory acceptable for everybody is possible. Which should be the ground of such theory, uniting the particular ethical approaches? According to the author moral philosophy responding to contemporary developments should go back to the question from Plato’s Gorgias: „How should I live?“ This question is directly connected with (...) further questions: „What in life is really valuable?“; „What in life is worth following?“; „What actions and life objectives are valuable?“; „What is the best way of leaving our lifes?“ All these questions are closely connected with another one: „From what perspective can we judge the values of the prospective elements of life?“ Put in another words: „How can I know, how should I live?“ This conception draws strongly on William’s attempt at restoring the question „How should I live?“ as the first question of moral philosophy. (shrink)

On Islamic ethics and conduct of life for Muslims.

Critical study on with special reference to peripatetics, Avicenna, 980-1037.

The authors study opera from the perspective of the theories of psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, and argue that opera's second death corresponded with the rise of psychoanalysis in the early 20th century. With a preface by Lanfossi and an afterword by Alberto Toscano.